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This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test competing conjectures 
about the evolution of public attitudes toward nanotechnology. The “rational enlight-
enment” hypothesis holds that members of the public will become favorably disposed 
to nanotechnology as balanced and accurate information about it disseminates. The 
“cultural cognition” hypothesis, in contrast, holds that members of the public are 
likely to polarize along cultural lines when exposed to such information. Using a be-
tween-subjects design (N = 1,862), the experiment compared the perceptions of sub-
jects exposed to balanced information on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology to 
the perceptions of subjects exposed to no information. The results strongly confirmed 
the cultural polarization hypothesis and furnished no support for the rational enlight-
enment hypothesis. Data obtained in the experiment also suggested that the observed 
correlation in the general public between familiarity with nanotechnology and a posi-
tive view of it is spurious: familiarity does not cause a favorable view; rather other in-
fluences, including individualistic cultural values, incline certain individuals both to 
form a positive view and to learn about nanotechnology. The paper also discusses the 
implications of these findings for promoting informed public understandings of 
nanotechnology. 
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1.  Introduction 
Its immense range of potential applications—scientific, commercial, 
medical, and more—marks nanotechnology as one of the most promising new 
forms of applied science. The future of nanotechnology, however, will depend 
not just on anticipation of its likely benefits but also on concern about its pos-
sible risks. Most members of the public have heard little or nothing about 
nanotechnology. Should they react with fear as they learn more, regulators ap-
plying the “precautionary principle” (Sunstein, 2005) might well be disposed to 
enact restrictions that delay its development or even stifle investment in this 
nascent science. 
How is public opinion toward nanotechnology likely to evolve? Does the 
answer depend on what future study reveals about the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology? Or will other influences—ones that operate independently of 
the best available scientific information—play a decisive role? 
There have been numerous survey-based studies of public attitudes to-
ward nanotechnology. Most find the public has a modestly positive view of 
nanotechnology (Currall, Kind, Lane, Madera & Turner 2006; Scheufele, 
Corley, Dunwoody, Shih, Hillback, Elliott, Guston, 2007), and that those who 
know the most are in fact the most favorably disposed toward it (Cobb & Ma-
coubrie 2004; Hart 2006, 2007; Scheufele & Lowenstein 2005). 
Although such studies are extremely valuable, what we can deduce from 
them is limited by their methodology. Because they are surveys and not ex-
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089230
periments, these studies do not tell us tell how uninformed members of the 
public are likely to react as they learn more. Likewise, they cannot tell us 
whether relatively well informed members of the public are positively disposed 
because they have learned more about nanotechnology or instead whether they 
have chosen to learn more because they are positively disposed toward 
nanotechnology for some other reason. 
This paper reports the result of an experiment aimed at addressing those 
issues.  The experiment involved comparing the perceptions of individuals who 
received no information on nanotechnology to those of individuals we exposed 
to balanced information on its risks and benefits. We found that relative to the 
uninformed subjects, subjects exposed to information polarized along various 
lines, including cultural predispositions toward environmental and technologi-
cal risks generally.  We also found that the correlation between level of knowl-
edge toward nanotechnology and a positive assessment of nanotechnology was 
spurious. That is, rather than familiarity with nanotechnology causing subjects 
to view the benefits of nanotechnology as outweighing its risks, a third influ-
ence—likely a pro-technology, cultural predisposition—was causing both. 
These findings are consistent with a growing body of research on the in-
fluence of cultural values on cognition of risk (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 
2006).  They imply that it would be a mistake to assume that public percep-
tions of nanotechnology risks will necessarily move in the direction of the best 
available scientific data.  But at the same time, they suggest how those inter-
ested in the formation of informed public opinion should proceed to maximize 
the likelihood that the best scientific understandings will gain public accep-
tance. 
Subsequent sections of the paper fill out these claims. Section 2 presents 
the theoretical and practical motivation behind the study in the form of two 
competing hypotheses about the formation of public attitudes toward 
nanotechnology. Section 3 describes the design of the study, and Section 4 its 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
the study findings both for future research on nanotechnology risk perceptions 
and for the development of strategies for promoting informed public.  
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2. Two Hypotheses: Rational Enlightenment vs. Cultural Cognition 
How might the American public, which is currently knows little about 
nanotechnology, respond to information about it?  We’ll describe two competing 
answers. One can be called the “rational enlightenment” hypothesis, the other 
the “cultural cognition” hypothesis. 
The rational enlightenment hypothesis holds, essentially, that members 
of the public can be expected to form positive attitudes toward nanotechnology 
as they learn more.  The basis for the hypothesis is existing public opinion re-
search. That research shows that very few members of the public have heard 
about nanotechnology, but that those who say they have heard about it believe 
that its benefits are likely to far outweigh its risks.  Extrapolating, proponents 
of the rational enlightenment hypothesis infer that as more people are exposed 
to information about nanotechnology, they will form similarly positive assess-
ments as well, at least so long as media coverage remains balanced and in-
formed by accurate science (Cobb & Macourbie 2004; Hart 2006, 2007; Cur-
rall, Kind, Lane, Madera & Turner 2006; Scheufele, Corley, Dunwoody, Shih, 
Hillback, Elliott, Guston, 2007). 
There are a number of reasons, however, to be skeptical about the ra-
tional enlightenment hypothesis.  One is selection bias.  Again, relatively few 
members of the public have heard about nanotechnology at this point; in some 
polls, 80% report that they have heard either “little” or “nothing at all” about it. 
The 20% or so, then, who say they have heard either a modest amount or a 
great deal about nanotechnology are doing something unusual: attaining in-
formation about this novel science. Maybe the same set of forces that are dis-
posing these particular people to learn about nanotechnology before others do 
is also disposing them to form positive views about it.  If so, one cannot reliably 
generalize from them to the public at large in assessing the impact of informa-
tion on attitudes toward nanotechnology. 
Another reason to be skeptical of the rational enlightenment hypothesis 
is a lesson taught by the study of public risk perceptions generally.  It is that 
members of the public do not tend to react in a uniform way, much less in a 
uniformly positive way, to information about risk.  Instead they act in disparate 
ways depending on various individual characteristics (Slovic 2000). 
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Among the characteristics that matter a lot, research has shown, are in-
dividuals’ basic values, or cultural orientations.1  The phenomenon of “cultural 
cognition” refers to the tendency of persons to conform their factual beliefs 
about the risks and benefits of a putatively dangerous activity to their cultural 
appraisals of these activities (DiMaggio 1997; Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 
2006).  Basically, it is much easier, from a psychological point of view, to be-
lieve that behavior one finds noble is also socially beneficial, and behavior one 
finds debased is dangerous, than vice versa.  This dynamic has been shown to 
lead people of diverse cultural outlooks to polarize as they react to information 
on various risks—from global warming to domestic terrorism, from school 
shootings to mandatory vaccination of school girls against HPV (Cultural Cog-
nition Project 2007b). 
Why should we expect the situation to turn out differently in the case of 
nanotechnology?  The second hypothesis about the evolution of public atti-
tudes toward nanotechnology—the cultural cognition hypothesis—is that it will 
not. In the normal course, people will tend to polarize along cultural lines.  
Adapting a framework from Douglas (1970), studies of the cultural cogni-
tion of risk characterizes cultural worldviews, or preferences for how society 
should be organized, along two cross-cutting dimensions: “individualism-
communitarianism” and “hierarchy-egalitarianism.”  Persons holding individu-
alistic worldviews tend to be dismissive of environmental and technological 
risks because they perceive (subconsciously) that crediting them would justify 
restraining markets and other kinds of private orderings that people with indi-
vidualistic values like. Individuals holding hierarchal preferences react simi-
larly because they associate assertions of environmental and technological risk 
with challenges to societal and governmental elites. Persons who are relatively 
egalitarian in outlook, in contrast, tend to embrace technological risk claims 
because doing so is congenial to their resentment of commerce and industry as 
activities that generate inequality. Those of a communitarian disposition, too, 
                                       
1 There are numerous studies, including: Dake (1991); Ellis & Thompson (1997); Gyawali 
(1999); Jenkins-Smith (2001); Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz (2007); Marris, Langford 
& Langford O’Riordan (1998); Peters, Burraston & Mertz (2004); Peters & Slovic (1996); Steg & 
Sievers (2000); Poortinga, Steg & Vlec (2002; Wildavsky & Dake (1990). 
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are relatively risk-sensitive, because they view business and industry as sym-
bols of the pursuit of unconstrained self-interest. Such tendencies are particu-
larly pronounced among persons holding combinations (hierarchical and indi-
vidualistic, egalitarian and communitarian) of these values (Kahan et. al 2007). 
With respect to nanotechnology, then, the cultural cognition hypothesis 
holds that as individuals learn more about nanotechnology they will form risk 
perceptions that reflect the dispositions toward environmental risk associated 
with their worldviews. Absent some calculated effort to frame information in a 
manner that makes nanotechnology appealing to persons of diverse values, in-
dividuals who hold relative egalitarian and communitarian worldviews will per-
ceive nanotechnology to be dangerous, while those who hold relatively hier-
archal and individualist worldviews will perceive it to be safe, as people with 
these dispositions learn more about this novel science. 
3.  Experimental Study Design 
3.1. Overview 
We designed an experiment to test the rational enlightenment and cul-
tural cognition hypotheses.  That design (explained in more detail below) in-
volved comparing the risk perceptions of subjects whom we exposed to bal-
anced information on nanotechnology to those whom we did not expose to such 
information. 
The rationale for dividing the subjects into two groups was to facilitate a 
valid assessment of the effect of information.  The Hart surveys (2006, 2007) 
had evaluated the impact of information by measuring the nanotechnology risk 
perceptions of one group of subjects before and after they received information. 
In such a design, changes in responses could be thought to reflect a contrived 
disposition on the part of subjects to appear open-minded and receptive to in-
formation. By comparing responses of two separate groups of subjects—one of 
whose members received information and another whose members did not—
our between-subjects design avoided this confounding explanation for any 
change in views. 
The two hypotheses generate different predictions about the impact of in-
formation exposure.  If the rational enlightenment experiment is correct, one 
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would expect subjects exposed to information, particularly those who previ-
ously had little or no familiarity with nanotechnology, to form views more posi-
tive than those held by the subjects not exposed to information.  The cultural 
cognition hypothesis, in contrast, implies that relative to subjects not exposed 
to information, subjects exposed to such information will react disparately—
some more positively, some more negatively—depending on their cultural 
worldviews. The design of the experiment thus called for various measures that 
would enable detection of such effects. 
3.2. Sample 
The sample consisted of a diverse sample of approximately 1,850 sub-
jects demographically weighted to reflect national representativeness. They 
were drawn randomly from a panel of approximately 40,000 individuals re-
cruited by Knowledge Networks for participation in scholarly public opinion 
analysis.2 The subjects were administered an on-line survey-experiment that 
consisted of approximately 50 questions and that took an average of approxi-
mately 10 minutes to complete.3  Survey responses were collected between De-
cember 14, 2006, and December 28, 2006. 
3.3. Experimental Manipulation: Information Exposure 
As indicated, subjects were divided into two groups.  The “no information 
treatment” group was exposed to no information about nanotechnology aside 
from a minimal introductory statement: 
Now we would like to know what you think about nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, predict and make things 
on the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules.  Materials created 
with nanotechnology can often be made to exhibit very different physical, 
chemical, and biological properties than their normal size counterparts. 
This brief and nonjudgmental language, adapted from Hart (2006), was in-
cluded with the expectation that without at least a minimal description of 
nanotechnology subject who indicated lack of prior familiarity with nanotech-
                                       
2 A more complete description of the composition of Knowledge Networks and of the demo-
graphic characteristics of the sample used in this study appears in Appendix A. 
3 Pertinent elements of the survey instrument appear in Appendix B.  
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nology would feel it was inappropriate to respond to items soliciting their atti-
tudes toward it even if they had an opinion on nanotechnology’s relative risks 
and benefits. 
The “information treatment” group received the introductory statement 
plus two additional paragraphs.  Also adapted from Hart (2006), the para-
graphs (the order of which was randomly varied) related, respectively, to the 
benefits and risks of nanotechnology: 
The potential benefits of nanotechnology include the use of nanomateri-
als in products to make them stronger, lighter and more effective.  Some 
examples are food containers that kill bacteria, stain-resistant clothing, 
high performance sporting goods, faster, smaller computers, and more 
effective skincare products and sunscreens.  Nanotechnology also has 
the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease, clean up 
the environment, enhance national security, and provide cheaper energy.   
While there has not been conclusive research on the potential risks of 
nanotechnology, there are concerns that some of the same properties 
that make nanomaterials useful might make them harmful.  It is thought 
that some nanomaterials may be harmful to humans if they are breathed 
in and might cause harm to the environment.  There are also concerns 
that invisible, nanotechnology-based monitoring devices could pose a 
threat to national security and personal privacy. 
The sizes of the two groups differed: approximately 1,500 for the no-
information treatment group and approximately 350 for the information-
treatment group.  The larger sample size for the no-information group was se-
lected in order to permit confident generalizations from subject responses to 
attitudes in the American public at large.4  The smaller sample used for the in-
formation-treatment group was anticipated to be large enough to permit detec-
tion of the hypothesized cultural polarization effects across subjects of diverse 
cultural orientations and other characteristics. 
                                       
4 Additional findings relating to public opinion on nanotechnology generally are described in 
greater detail in a report prepared for the Project on Emerging Nanotechnology (Cultural Cogni-
tion Project 2007a). 
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3.4. Measures 
3.4.1. Cultural Worldviews 
The subjects’ cultural worldviews were measured with two scales devel-
oped for use in a previous national study of cultural orientations and risk per-
ceptions (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2006).  “Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism” (“Hierarchy”) consisted of 12 items, and “Individualism-
Communitarianism” (“Individualism”) 18 items, designed to assess subjects’ 
worldviews along those two dimensions.  Both were highly reliable (Hierarchy, α 
= .81; Individualism α = .83). Based on their scores relative to the median ones 
for Hierarchy and Individualism, individuals were designated as either “Hier-
archs” or “Egalitarians,” and as either “Individualists” or “Communitarians.”  
They were further divided into four distinct types— “Hierarchical Individual-
ists,” “Hierarchical Communitarians,” “Egalitarian Individualists, and “Egalitar-
ian Communitarians”—based on their scores relative to the means on both 
scales. 
3.4.2. Other Individual Characteristics 
Various demographic characteristics of interest were collected.  These in-
cluded the subjects’ races, their genders, their ages, their education levels, 
their household incomes, their political party affiliations, and their political ide-
ologies (measured with a liberal-conservative scale).  
3.4.3. Nanotechnology 
The experiment-survey instrument contained a number of items relating 
to nanotechnology.  One (“Nanoknow”), used in previous studies (Hart 2006, 
2007; Cobb & Macoubrie 2004) asked “[h]ow much have you heard about 
nanotechnology before today?”: “nothing at all,” “just a little,” “some,” and “a 
lot.”5  Subjects who indicated they had heard “nothing at all” or “just a little” 
                                       
5 Subjects were instructed that they should refuse to answer this or any other question on 
which they were “unsure.” This instruction has been found to generate the same rate of “don’t 
know/unsure” responses among on-line survey respondents as permitting only a volunteered 
“don’t know/unsure” response in telephone surveys (Dennis, Li, & Chatt 2004). 
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were classified as being “unfamiliar” with nanotechnology, those who had 
heard “some” or “a lot” as “familiar” with it. 
Finally, subjects’ perceptions of nanotechnology risks was measured with 
an item (“Nanorisk”) that asked them “[d]o you think the risks of nanotechnol-
ogy will greatly outweigh its benefits, the risks of nanotechnology will slightly 
outweigh its benefits, the benefits of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its 
risks[,] [or] the benefits of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its risks[?]”  
Subjects responded to this item after reading the introductory statement and, 
in the case of the information-treatment group, the balanced-information para-
graphs. Response were treated as forming a four-point scale (reverse coded) to 
asses mean nanotechnology risk perceptions across cultural and other groups 
of interest. 
3.4.4. Other Risk Perceptions 
We also collected data on subjects’ perceptions of various other societal 
risks. Subjects were asked to indicate how much risk each of a diverse set of 
conditions and activities posed “to the safety or health of people in our society” 
using a four-point scale (1 = “almost no risk”; 2 = “slight risk”; 3 = “moderate 
risk”; and 4 = “high risk”). 
4. Results 
4.1. Generalized Risk-Insensitivity of Subjects Familiar with 
Nanotechnology 
Within the no-information treatment, we found (consistent with Cobb & 
Macoubrie 2004; Hart 2006, 2007), a correlation between familiarity with 
nanotechnology and perceptions of its risks and benefits. The vast majority of 
these subjects—over 80%—had heard either “a little” or “nothing at all” about 
nanotechnology before the study (Figure 1).  Among the relatively small group 
of subjects familiar with nanotechnology—the ones who said they had previ-
ously heard either “some” or “a lot” about it—81% said they believed that the 
risks would outweigh the benefits, and only 17% that the benefits would out-
weigh the risks. Among the much larger group who were relatively unfamiliar—
those who said they had heard either “little” or “nothing” about nanotechnol-
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ogy—47% said that the benefits would outweigh the risks, and 40% that the 
risks would outweigh the benefits (Table 1). 
“How much have you heard about nanotechnology before today?”
n ≈ 1,500, margin of error +/- 2.5%, 95% confidence level.
Just a Little
28%
Some
13%
A Lot
5%
Nothing at All
53%
 
Figure 1. Familiarity with Nanotechnology 
 
 Benefit > Risk  Risk > Benefit  Unsure 
Overall 53%  36%  11% 
Familiar 81%  17%  2% 
Unfamiliar 47%  40%  13% 
n ≈ 1,500. ± 2.5% at 95% confidence interval. 
Table 1. Perceptions of Nanotechnology Based on Familiarity (No-Information Treat-
ment) 
Interestingly, however, there was also significant correlation between fa-
miliarity with nanotechnology and societal risk perceptions generally (Figure 2). 
Obviously, these correlations are spurious. People who are familiar with 
nanotechnology are generally insensitive to a wide range of risk; it is not at all 
plausible, however, to think that their familiarity with nanotechnology is the 
reason they are relatively unworried about private gun ownership, mad cow 
disease, nuclear power, genetically modified food, the internet, pornography, 
and gay marriage. It is much more likely that some third variable explains both 
these individuals’ lack of concern with these risks and their disposition to learn 
something about nanotechnology. 
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“How much risk do you believe each of the following poses to the safety or health 
of people in our society?”
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N ≈ 1,500. Mean risk perceptions for each group measured on 4-pt scale. Difference in means 
for all comparisons significant p < .05.  
Figure 2. Societal Risk Perceptions of Persons Familiar and Unfamiliar with Nanotech-
nology 
This conclusion in itself casts doubt on the rational enlightenment hy-
pothesis.  If familiarity with nanotechnology does not cause societal-risk insen-
sitivity generally, why assume that such familiarity causes lack of concern 
about nanotechnology risks in particular? Why not infer, instead, that the lat-
ter correlation, like the former, is spurious—that is, that some influence causes 
people both not to worry about nanotechnology and to want to learn about it?  
If that is so, there would be no more reason to believe that exposing individuals 
unfamiliar with nanotechnology to information about it will make them less 
concerned with nanotechnology than there is to think that exposing them to 
that same information will make them less concerned with, say, mad cow dis-
ease. 
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4.2. Impact of Information Exposure 
The impact of information on persons unfamiliar with nanotechnology 
was, of course, the focus of the between-subjects information experiment. 
Comparison of the risk perceptions of subjects in the no-information and in-
formation treatments is reported in Table 2 and Figure 3 and Figure 5). 
 Mean Risk/Benefit Perception 
 No Information  Information-Exposed  Significance 
Overall 2.66  2.65  – 
Men 2.81  2.91   
Women 2.50  2.45   
Whites 2.67  2.76  a** 
Blacks 2.32  2.02  a** 
Republicans 2.66  2.74   
Democrats 2.66  2.62   
Liberals 2.78  2.62  b** 
Conservatives 2.66  2.71  b** 
Hierarchs 2.64  2.72  c* 
Egalitarians 2.67  2.58  c* 
Individualists 2.62  2.73  d** 
Communitarians 2.70  2.54  d** 
Hierarchal Individualists 2.65  2.81  e**, f** 
Hierarchical Communitarians 2.63  2.47  e** 
Egalitarian Individualists 2.56  2.60   
Egalitarian Communitarians 2.73  2.57  f** 
Not Familiar 3.23  3.11   
Familiar 2.51  2.51   
Group means on 4-pt scale. Shared alphabetic notation indicates significant difference in differences between mean scores 
of groups across conditions: * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01, 1-tail. 
Table 2. Risk/Benefit Perception by Group Across Experimental Conditions 
The results were strongly consistent with the cultural cognition hypothe-
sis. Whereas Hierarchs, Egalitarians, Individualists and Communitarians all 
had roughly comparable mean evaluations in the no-information condition, 
these types significantly diverged relative to one another in expected direc-
tions—Hierarchs and Individualists toward benefit, and Egalitarians and 
Communitarians toward risk—in the information-exposure condition (Figure 
3). 
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Hiearchs (+.08)
Egalitarians (-.09)
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Figure 3. Impact of Information Exposure on Subjects Defined by Cultural Worldviews 
We saw a similar effect across subjects divided into the four cultural 
types formed by the overlap of the Hierarchy-Egalitarian and Individualism-
Communitarian worldview dimensions.  Although not significantly different 
from each other in the no-information condition, Egalitarian Communitarians 
and Hierarchical Individualists assumed their characteristically risk-sensitive 
and risk-skeptical positions, respectively, in the information-exposure condi-
tion (Table 2, Figure 4).  Hierarchical Communitarians and Hierarchical Indi-
vidualists also polarized, suggesting that a combination of hierarchical and in-
dividualistic views most powerfully disposed subjects to be receptive to the 
benefits of nanotechnology. 
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Figure 4. Effect of Information Exposure on Subjects Defined by Combinations of Cul-
tural Worldviews 
Subjects also polarized along other lines. Thus, the gap between whites 
and African-Americans widened in the information-exposure condition.  Liber-
als also adopted a more risk-sensitive stance, and conservatives a less risk-
sensitive one. Because these characteristics tend to correlate with cultural 
worldviews (Kahan & Braman 2006), polarization along these lines is also con-
sistent with the cultural cognition hypothesis.  
The results also permit evaluation of the rational enlightenment hy-
pothesis. That hypothesis implied that subjects previously unfamiliar with 
nanotechnology would form a more positive view in the information-exposure 
condition than in the no-information condition; it implied as well that the gap 
between previously unfamiliar and previously familiar subjects would be 
smaller in the information-exposure condition.  
Neither of these effects was observed. On net, individuals who were not 
familiar with nanotechnology before the experiment did not move in the direc-
tion of those where were familiar in the information condition.  There was no 
significant net effect on those persons.  The reason is that these subjects previ-
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ously unfamiliar reacted diversely to the information—some becoming more 
concerned about risks and some less—depending on their cultural predisposi-
tions. 
Familiar (-.12)
Unfamiliar (0)
2.40
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Figure 5. Impact of Information Exposure Across Subjects Defined by Prior Familiarity 
with Nanotechnology 
This finding, too, strongly suggests that that the relationship observed 
between familiarity with nanotechnology and lack of concern about its risks in 
the general population is spurious. The failure of information exposure to move 
subjects previously unfamiliar with nanotechnology in a uniformly positive di-
rection is exactly what one would expect if the correlation between previous 
familiarity and a positive view is the result of a third variable that explains both 
skepticism toward nanotechnology risks and a disposition to learn about 
nanotechnology. The only question that remains is what that third variable 
might be. 
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4.3. Explaining Familiarity with Nanotechnology: The Impact of 
Gender, Education, and Individualism 
Our results give us a pretty good idea of the answer to that question. Re-
gressing familiarity with nanotechnology on the various individual-
characteristic and cultural measures (Table 3, Model 1) revealed the four 
strongest predictors to be gender (OR = 0.40, p = .00) and race (OR = .52, p = 
.00), both of which predict less familiarity, and education (OR = 1.38, p = .00) 
and individualism (OR = 1.39, p = .02), both which predict more. To illustrate 
the practical effect of these characteristics, stochastic simulations (King, Tomz 
& Wittenberg 2000) can be used to specify the likelihood that a person possess-
ing particular combinations of them  would indicate that a person holding one 
or another combination of them has heard “nothing at all,” “just a little,” 
“some,” or “a lot” about nanotechnology (Table 4, Figure 6). The analysis shows 
that the likelihood a person will indicate being familiar with nanotechnology 
(that is, having heard “some” or “a lot” about it) ranges from 10% (± 2%) for a 
person who is an African-American but in all other respects no different from 
the population mean to 63% (± 3%) for a white male who is one standard devia-
tion more individualistic and who has a Ph.D. 
This finding extends the results of the study in two respects. First, it 
helps to explain the existence of the observed correlation between familiarity 
with nanotechnology and low concern with the riskiness of various activities, 
including development of nanotechnology (§ 4.1). Individualism tends to predict 
a low perception risk for behavior that manifest individual initiative and choice. 
Accordingly, if individualism also disposes persons to learn about nanotechnol-
ogy, one would expect those who are relatively more familiar with nanotechnol-
ogy to be insensitive to those types of risks—not because of what they have 
learned about nanotechnology, obviously, but because they are individualistic 
in their outlooks. Individualism, in other words, is one of the influences that 
accounts for the spurious correlation between familiarity with nanotechnology 
and a perception that its benefits outweigh its risks. 
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Logistic Regression Analysis 
    Model 1   Model 2 
Female  0.40  0.41 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Black (vs. white)  0.52  0.51 
  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Other_minority (vs. white)  1.02  1.02 
  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Education  1.38  1.36 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Age  0.99  0.99 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Household Income  0.99  0.99 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Republican (vs. democrat)  1.06  1.04 
  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Independent (vs. democrat)  0.99  0.96 
  (0.22)  (0.21) 
Conservative  1.02  1.02 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism  0.75  0.11 
  (0.10)  (0.06) 
Individualism-Communitarianism  1.39  0.24 
  (0.20)  (0.13) 
Individualism x Hierarchy  --  2.01 
        (0.40) 
Pseudo R2  .07  .07 
log likelihood  -1832.88  -1826.85 
Prob > Chi2   .000   .000 
N = 1785. Dependent variable is Nanoknow. Predictor effects are odds ratios. Standard errors 
in parentheses. Bold typeface indicates p ≤ .05. 
Table 3. Logistical Regression Analysis of Familiarity with Nanotechnology 
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“How much have you heard about nanotechnology before today?”
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Figure 6. Likelihood of Degree of Familiarity with Nanotechnology 
 
 
African Ameri-
can 
White  
Commun. 
White 
Individ. 
White 
Individ., BA 
White 
Individ., PhD, 
Female 
White Individ., 
PhD, Male 
Nothing 67% ± 6%) 55% (± 3%) 49% (± 3%) 34% (± 3%) 24% (± 4%) 11% (± 2%) 
A Little 23% (± 3%) 30% (± 2%) 33% (± 2%) 37% (± 2%) 35% (± 2%) 26% (± 3%) 
Some 8% (± 2%) 12% (± 1%) 14% (± 1%) 22% (± 2%) 30% (± 4%) 39% (± 3%) 
A Lot 2% (± 0%) 3% (± 1%) 4% (± 1%) 7% (± 1%) 11% (± 3%) 24% (± 5%) 
N = 1,785. Parentheticals reflect margins of error at p = .05 
Table 4. Likelihood of Degree of Familiarity with Nanotechnology 
Second, the finding that individualism is one of the influences that ex-
plains the disposition to learn about nanotechnology helps to corroborate our 
interpretation of the information-exposure experiment results. An anti-
individualist or communitarian disposition tends to incline persons to be ac-
cepting of claims of environmental and technological risks. It is therefore not 
surprising that relatively communitarian subjects unfamiliar with nanotech-
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nology do not form the positive evaluation of nanotechnology that the predomi-
nantly individualistic persons already familiar with it have. 
The analysis of who is disposed to become familiar with nanotechnology 
does display one apparently anomaly. The logistical regression analysis reveals 
(Table 3, Model 1) that a tendency toward a hierarchical worldview predicts less 
familiarity with nanotechnology (OR = 0.75, p = .04). This appears surprising 
because hierarchy, like individualism, is associated generally with environ-
mental risk skepticism and, in the information-exposure experiment generated 
a low assessment of nanotechnology risks. It would appear, then, that hierar-
chy, unlike individualism, does not play a role in the motivation of persons who 
are disposed to form a positive view of nanotechnology to learn more about it. 
But this inference is at least partially offset by a second regression 
analysis. In this one (Table 3, Model 2), a variable, Individualism x Hierarchy, 
is added to measure the interaction of individualism and hierarchy. The odds 
ratio associated with it is 2.01 (p = .00). This indicates that for any given per-
son the odds are twice as high that an increasingly hierarchical disposition will 
be associated with more rather than less familiarity with nanotechnology as 
that person’s worldview becomes progressively more individualistic; likewise, 
the odds are twice as high that an increasingly individualistic disposition will 
be associated with more rather than less familiarity with nanotechnology as a 
person’s worldview becomes progressively more hierarchical.  Simply put, per-
sons are most disposed to learn about nanotechnology as their worldviews be-
come simultaneously individualistic and hierarchical. This is consistent with 
the experiment finding that information exposure has a particular pronounced 
influence on hierarchical individualists. 
5. Conclusion: Implications for the Future of Public Opinion on 
Nanotechnology 
The findings of this study do not by any means permit the future of 
nanotechnology to be predicted with complete confidence.  But they should 
help those who want to assure informed development of nanotechnology to 
identify the steps necessary to make that outcome more likely. 
It would be a mistake, this study suggests, to assume that nothing more 
need be done than to supply people with scientifically sound information. Lack-
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ing the time and expertise to evaluate technical data on risk—particular when 
it is disputed—individuals naturally tend to credit information selectively de-
pending on its congeniality to their cultural predispositions (Wildavsky 1987). 
As a result, issues of risk tend to polarize on cultural lines (Kahan et al. 2006). 
Our results show that exposure to even a small amount of balanced in-
formation about nanotechnology can result in polarization of this sort.  Be-
cause individuals in the real world are much more likely to select information 
in a biased fashion that matches their cultural and political dispositions (Mutz 
& Martin, 2001), one might anticipate even more extreme polarization outside 
the lab.  Nanotechnology, on this view, could go the route of nuclear power and 
other controversial technologies, becoming a focal point of culturally infused 
political conflict. 
At the same time, there is nothing in this study to suggest that such a 
future is inevitable.  It seems unlikely that the tendency of persons to filter in-
formation through emotion and values can be neutralized.  But the tendency of 
these information-processing mechanisms to divide people almost certainly can 
be.  Social psychology, moreover, is making important advances in identifying 
techniques for framing information on controversial issues of policy in a man-
ner that makes it possible for persons of diverse values to derive the same fac-
tual information from it (Cohen, Aronson & Steele 2000).  With further study, it 
is likely that these techniques can be used to guide risk communication and 
thus enhance democratic deliberations about risk-regulation policy—on 
nanotechnology (Scheufle 2006) and on other issues (Cultural Cognition Project 
2007b). 
The practical lesson of this study, then, is that those who favor informed 
public deliberations over nanotechnology should be neither sanguine nor 
bleak.  Instead they should be psychologically realistic.  And if they are, they 
will see the urgent need for additional efforts to develop risk communication 
strategies that make it possible for culturally diverse citizens to converge on 
policies that promote their common interests. 
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Appendix A 
Knowledge Networks Panels and Sample for this Study 
1. Knowledge Networks 
Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public 
opinion research firm.  It maintains an active respondent pool of some 40,000 
persons who are recruited to participate in on-line surveys and experiments 
administered on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and private 
businesses.  Knowledge Network respondents agree to participate in three to 
four surveys per month in exchange for Internet access and other forms of 
compensation.  It uses recruitment and sampling methods that assure a di-
verse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S. population.  
Numerous studies have concluded that on-line testing of Knowledge Network 
samples generates results equivalent in their reliability to conventional ran-
dom-digit-dial surveys 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html), and studies us-
ing Knowledge Networks facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed aca-
demic journals (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/reviewer-info.html; 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/KN%20Bibliog%205-29-
2007%20External.pdf).  
2. Demographic composition of sample for this study 
a. Total number of subjects: 1,862. 
b. Gender: 51% female, 49% male. 
c. Race: 72% white, 10.1% African-American. 
d. Average age: 46.4 years. 
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e. Median household income: $35,000 to $40,000. 
f. Median education level: Some college. 
 
- 24 - 
Appendix B 
Select Experiment Survey Instrument Items 
1.  Cultural Orientation Scales 
Four-point response scale for all items: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, 
Agree and Strongly Agree. 
Individualism-Solidarism Scale 
1. IINTRSTS.  The government interferes far too much in our everyday 
lives. 
2. SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep peo-
ple from hurting themselves.  
3. IPROTECT.  It's not the government's business to try to protect peo-
ple from themselves.  
4. IPRIVACY.  The government should stop telling people how to live 
their lives.  
5. SPROTECT.  The government should do more to advance society's 
goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.   
6. SLIMCHOI.  Government should put limits on the choices individu-
als can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society.   
7. SNEEDS.  It's society's responsibility to make sure everyone's basic 
needs are met. 
8. INEEDY.  It's a mistake to ask society to help every person in need.  
9. SRELY.  People should be able to rely on the government for help 
when they need it.  
10. IRESPON.  Society works best when it lets individuals take responsi-
bility for their own lives without telling them what to do.   
11. ITRIES.  Our government tries to do too many things for too many 
people. We should just let people take care of themselves.  
12. IFIX.  If the government spent less time trying to fix everyone's prob-
lems, we'd all be a lot better off.  
13. IENJOY.  People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy 
their wealth as they see fit. 
14. IMKT.  Free markets—not government programs—are the best way to 
supply people with the things they need.  
15. IPROFIT.  Private profit is the main motive for hard work.  
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16. IGOVWAST.  Government regulations are almost always a waste of 
everyone's time and money.  
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism Scale 
1. HEQUAL.  We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this 
country.  
2. HREVDIS1.  Nowadays it seems like there is just as much dis-
crimination against whites as there is against blacks.  
3. EWEALTH.  Our society would be better off if the distribution of 
wealth was more equal.  
4. ERADEQ.  We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between 
the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.  
5. EDISCRIM.  Discrimination against minorities is still a very seri-
ous problem in our society.  
6. HREVDIS2.  It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other 
groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.  
7. HCHEATS.  It seems like the criminals and welfare cheats get all 
the breaks, while the average citizen picks up the tab.  
8. EDIVERS.  It's old-fashioned and wrong to think that one cul-
ture's set of values is better than any other culture's way of seeing the 
world.  
9. HWMNRTS.  The women's rights movement has gone too far.  
10. ESEXIST.  We live in a sexist society that that is fundamentally 
set up to discriminate against women.  
11. HTRADFAM.  A lot of problems in our society today come from 
the decline in the traditional family, where the man works and the woman 
stays home.  
12. HFEMININ.  Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.  
13. EROUGH.  Parents should encourage young boys to be more sen-
sitive and less rough and tough. 
2.  Other Risk Perception Items 
How much risk do you believe each of the following poses to the safety or 
health of people in our society? [Almost No Risk, Slight Risk, Moderate Risk, 
High Risk] 
 
GUNOWN. Private Gun Ownership 
COW. Mad Cow Disease 
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NUKEPOW. Nuclear Power 
PORNO. Pornography 
GENFOOD. Genetically Modified Food 
INTERNET. The Internet 
ANTIABORTION. Legal Restrictions on Abortion 
GAYMAR. Gay Marriage 
3.  Nanotechnology Items 
General Introduction and knowledge item 
INTRO9. Now we would like to know what you think about nanotechnol-
ogy. Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, predict and make things on 
the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules.  Materials created with 
nanotechnology can often be made to exhibit very different physical, chemical, 
and biological properties than their normal size counterparts. 
NANOKNOW.  How much have you heard about nanotechnology before 
today? [Nothing at All, Just a Little, Some, A Lot] 
Information Manipulation 
The potential benefits of nanotechnology include the use of nanomateri-
als in products to make them stronger, lighter and more effective.  Some 
examples are food containers that kill bacteria, stain-resistant clothing, 
high performance sporting goods, faster, smaller computers, and more 
effective skincare products and sunscreens.  Nanotechnology also has 
the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease, clean up 
the environment, enhance national security, and provide cheaper energy.   
While there has not been conclusive research on the potential risks of 
nanotechnology, there are concerns that some of the same properties 
that make nanomaterials useful might make them harmful.  It is thought 
that some nanomaterials may be harmful to humans if they are breathed 
in and might cause harm to the environment.  There are also concerns 
that invisible, nanotechnology-based monitoring devices could pose a 
threat to national security and personal privacy. 
Risk/Benefit Item 
NANORISK.  Do you think  
(1) the risks of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its benefits 
(2) the risks of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its benefits 
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(3) the benefits of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its risks 
(4) the benefits of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its risks 
